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FRIDAY
JUNE 12, 1953

I spent most of the day working on two cables in reply to inquiries recently received from the State Department. The incoming and outgoing messages were as follows:

R

"EDCOL 64, June 9, 4 p.m.

"EYES ONLY BRUCE FROM SECRETARY.

"I would appreciate your personal estimate effect on ratification EDC by French Parliament of any Four Power conference with Soviets. It can be argued that French would postpone action on ratification until results conference were known if such conference were decided upon or even known to be under serious consideration. Pursuing this theory case could be made for actively seeking Four Power conference in belief this would most effectively contribute to ratification. Dilemmas other horn is obvious importance going to conference table with Soviets only on basis maximum strength and unity of West to which object EDC remains of overriding concern. Additional factor which you well know is growing feeling with Congress and American people of impatience and frustration over continuing delay EDC coming into force. Any excuse which would lift pressure for ratification from signatories but particularly France, could well result in delay so protracted as to sound death knell this paramount project.

"Whereas we consider key obstacles to EDC are in France would also like your views on effect Four Power conference prospect would have on other signatories. DULLES."

"COLED 101.

"EYES ONLY SECRETARY FROM BRUCE.

"RE EDCOL 64, June 9, 1953.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
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"1. To cause delay or abandonment of German rearmament and European unity is the major objective in Europe of the Soviet 'peace offensive'. Recent Soviet moves in Germany, combined with Churchill speech and progress on Korean armistice, have already created widespread feeling in Western Europe that Soviets want a four-power conference and that such a conference is desirable in near future and probably inevitable.

"Soviet propaganda, assisted by German socialists and French opponents of EDC, is attempting with considerable success to persuade Western Europeans that EDC and German rearmament plans are the real obstacles to holding talks and reducing tensions, and that the price for holding talks is the abandonment or at least indefinite delay of these plans. This feeling has in turn created fear on the part of some EDC supporters and in particular Adenauer that Western powers might sell EDC and European integration down the river in order to make four-power talks possible. The resultant confusion is a major factor delaying action by French and in lesser degree other Western Europe governments in taking definitive commitment involved pushing EDC ratification to a vote.

"To counter this Soviet offensive it is essential that the U. S. and its partners emerge from Bermuda Conference with a clear public statement of European policy including (1) that they are committed for peaceful purposes only to the creation within the general framework of NATO of a political, economic and military union in Western Europe; (2) that progress must continue towards such union - in particular through EDC ratification -- and such progress is fully consistent with the effort to reduce tensions through four-power talks or otherwise; and (3) that under no circumstances will they abandon this European policy of peace either as a condition for holding talks or as a concession to the Soviets during them.

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"The Soviet offensive would certainly be easier to deal with and the unity of the Allies easier to assure if EDC were already in force. But even assuming ratification this autumn, we cannot wait until then before deciding whether to meet with Soviets. If at all possible therefore, U. S. should try to bring about a firm decision at Bermuda either (1) to confer with Soviets or (2) not to confer with them. In the former case, it is essential conference take place as rapidly as possible after Bermuda talks and that negotiations either succeed or fail before autumn consideration of EDC by those parliaments which by then have not already acted. In either case we must push ahead with present plans including EDC ratification and rapid progress towards Political Community Treaty, which are valid regardless of development of relations between Soviet Union and the West.

"Our partners may bring up the thesis that to push on with EDC and German rearmament is incompatible with our expressed willingness to discuss general disarmament with Soviets. The answer in my opinion is that the existence of a common Western European defense within EDC is no more an obstacle to discussions on general disarmament than the existence of present national forces within NATO. Any disarmament negotiations will concern the level of armaments on both sides of the iron curtain; but under any conditions the Europeans will continue to have a right to assure their defense in common and the Germans a right and a duty to carry their share of the burden.

"2. As far as France in particular is concerned, the motives animating politicians and the people generally to favor a four-power conference are manifold. Amongst many that might be cited perhaps the most powerful is the natural tendency of human beings, despite the teachings of experience or history, to hope for an easy or miraculous issue out of their afflictions. Then, too, many

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hope that a settlement in Indo-China, a reduction in the burden of armaments and an elevation in the depressed standard of living of the average citizen may somehow quickly result. Others for entirely demagogic reasons capitalize on such hopes. Still others, imbued with distrust of the Germans, fear the German known more than the Soviet unknown or, suspicious of impending struggle between two giants, seek refuge in sterile neutralism.

"I doubt that agreement at Bermuda to hold four-power conference would have much effect in winning over any present opponents of EDC in French Parliament. But refusal to confer at this time, unless it can be explained in a manner that would convince Europeans, would almost certainly contribute to feeling that United States does not sincerely want peaceful settlement with Soviets, and would inflame anti-American sentiment in France and other parts of Western Europe. Such development would weaken position of EDC proponents in France and quite probably lead to defection of a number of marginal supporters whose votes essential to ratification. Thus rejection of four-power conference at this time would certainly complicate already difficult ratification situation.

"I thoroughly appreciate impatience and frustration in America and elsewhere over continuing delay EDC coming into force. But action on EDC by French Parliament is in any case most improbable before autumn. In light this time schedule, I do not repeat not think a four-power conference in near future would be as likely to give excuse for delay in ratification as would rejection of conference unless such rejection were definite and from propaganda standpoint appeared reasonable.

"3. To go into a four-power conference without a prior firm tripartite agreement by US, UK, and France on major issues would entail greater risks than to refuse such conference. Consequently, I believe that US should point out

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at Bermuda that it is skeptical of practical usefulness and prospects for success of four-power conference at this time. However, in view of strong feeling on subject advanced by its associates it is willing to consider participating in such conference provided there is an unqualified tripartite understanding reached at Bermuda on all essential issues likely to be discussed.

"In addition to statement described paragraph 1 above we will need to secure an iron-clad public commitment from Churchill that he will resolutely and whole-heartedly support European integration movements, including integration of Germany into European Community. French PriMin will presumably be already committed this point but hope President will utilize opportunities offered at Bermuda to obtain French pledge to proceed vigorously toward EDC ratification without additional protocols PAREN unless EDC-UK association takes protocol form END PAREN and development EPC Treaty. In addition, three powers should make clear that under no circumstances will they accept any Russian proposal designed to neutralize Germany.

"If reasonable agreement on major basic points cannot be had with our two partners I think US should refuse to participate in conference with Soviets even if this meant for example that Churchill would engage in bipartite conversations with them.

"5. As far as Germany is concerned I should think major consideration is effect Bermuda decisions on Adenauer's election campaign: if election results lead to substantial alteration German foreign policy, our European policy will suffer grave setback. This consideration makes it most important that any tripartite position be agreeable to Adenauer. Thing which might most strengthen Adenauer's hand is assurance that U.S., UK and France while favoring creation of united Germany will meanwhile firmly support integration of FedRep into Western

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European Community and that they will not abandon this policy in the face of any Russian pressure or blandishment. BRUCE."

"EDCOL 66, June 11, 7 PM.

"FOR BRUCE.

"House Foreign Affairs Committee tentatively approved by 2-1 vote amendment to Foreign Aid Bill providing that 1/2 Title I military assistance funds for FY 1954 must go to EDC.

"Exact text not yet available. Will cable when received. $2.079 billion in current House draft for title I military assistance, approximately 1/2 of which is scheduled for EDC countries. Hence effect of amendment is to cut off all new military assistance to EDC countries until treaty ratified.

"Sponsor of amendment was Representative Richards, ex-Chairman of Committee, who said purpose was to withhold half of Europe's military aid until unified European army is set up. Purpose is to make the European nations 'put up or shut up'. Richards said he felt it would help leaders in the EDC countries who can now turn to parliaments and say that US aid hinges on approval of unified defense plan.

"Would appreciate your comments urgently. DULLES."

"COLED 102.

"RE EDCOL 66, June 11.

"Some such move as now made by Congressman Richards would appear to have been almost inevitable.

"I think in principle it is inadvisable for Congress to impose specific restrictions of this character on use of foreign aid funds and thus embarrass the traditional conduct of foreign negotiations. Nevertheless I appreciate the impatience with which the members of Congress view the delay by our European

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partners in making possible a German military contribution to our joint European defense structure.

"There is little question in my mind that reaction in EDC countries and particularly in France will be strongly adverse to the Richards amendment in its present form. No European nation or statesman can fail publicly to express resentment at being pushed toward final decision on such fundamental and far-reaching matter as EDC as result US financial pressure. Public support and prestige our friends who are QUOTE making Europe UNQUOTE would probably be seriously damaged by resulting propaganda.

"It will also strengthen those in France who because of domestic political considerations, especially the dangerous state of the economy and finances, desire to lessen their military effort and possibly to withdraw from Indo-China and renounce all American aid. It would also give aid and comfort to those opponents of EDC who maintain that only interest of US in EDC is to obtain German troops.

"Another consideration is that, assuming France may be the principal obstacle to EDC ratification, this amendment would penalize the other prospective EDC members to the benefit of countries like Norway and Denmark and even the UK who have not wished to become partners in the proposed European Army structure. French and others will also argue that such action should not be taken without bilateral conversations between the US and the affected Governments and also discussions within NATO. Flexibility accorded to the Executive branch in the use of foreign aid would permit it to handle such aid more effectively and equitably.

"On the other hand, I think the Administration would face difficulties in disagreeing with the reasoning behind the House action. If properly presented, this reasoning would indicate that earmarked aid would not be used unless the Europeans themselves make our jointly stipulated forward strategy possible.

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If the Executive were given the final responsibility to use this aid in the light of Congressional advice rather than restricted by Congressional mandate, it might well be that it would have a considerable influence in placing the European governments and particularly that in France before their responsibilities.

"I do think, however, that the decision apparently contemplated by the Richards amendment, namely a black and white decision by Congress, would have unfortunate, unnecessary and undesirable repercussions. Whereas the intention of Congress might be carried out by the Executive branch if the latter were afforded considerable flexibility in a manner that would not unduly arouse European animosities against us and might be conducive to effective results, a strictly Congressional finding on this point would lend further color to the already widespread propaganda in Europe that there is a fundamental division in Washington between the Executive and Legislative branches as to our future courses in foreign policy.

"Although I am unfamiliar with the Congressional situation, I wonder if it would not be possible to have the wishes of the Foreign Affairs Committee expressed in a different form. Could its members not, instead of imposing a binding limitation on the use of foreign aid appropriations, say to the Executive branch of the US Government that they do not want to curtail its flexibility in dealing with this aid but desire the Executive branch to be on notice that Congress expects it to use such aid only in ways designed to bring about a successful implementation of the NATO forward strategy.

"It appears to me that this compromise might be workable if the Congress will consent to it. It would also seem to me to afford an opportunity for a better presentation of the American point of view than would the action contemplated by Mr. Richards although I have not seen the text of his remarks on the subject.

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"If this line were adopted, I think the presentation to the Europeans might be made along the following lines.

"1. The United States Government has consistently stated that our military assistance has been provided in support of a forward strategy plan agreed upon by NATO. If the means for accomplishing that plan are not forthcoming, it may no longer serve the interest of the common defense for us to continue to expend funds for the equipment of forces and the construction of infrastructure facilities in continental Europe, for we would not be justified in assuming that such forces and facilities can and will be defended. PAREN Once the French military and French Foreign Office understand that there may be no strong French continental forces unless there is an EDC, their attitude and the prospects of EDC ratification in France might improve considerably. END PAREN.

"2. To date no French Government has proposed an alternative to EDC, which after all was a French conception and which successive French Governments have asserted would eventually receive the favorable action of their parliament.

"3. French Governments as well as the German Government have said that the only way to arm Germany is through EDC. It has likewise been agreed amongst the NATO powers that a successful European defense can only be achieved by bringing in a German military contribution. Since the amounts appropriated by the American Congress for European military assistance are predicated on the above assumption regarding a German military contribution, the Congress is justified in not continuing to appropriate money and furnish equipment which might be almost worthless if there is no German participation.

"4. Our original promise of aid to our NATO partners was made before German rearmament was in question. Since that time a forward strategy has been determined based on German participation. If this participation is not achieved

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the amount and direction of aid would necessarily have to be different from what it would be if Germany made her contribution.

"5. Opponents of EDC will say the US is forcing this conception on the Europeans and will make anti-American propaganda use of this action. However, EDC was conceived on European initiative as a way safely to rearm Germany and as a part of a program for European union, within the general framework of NATO.

"6. The Secretary put the Europeans on notice during his trip to Europe that if a practical solution of the German question was not found there would have to be a reexamination of US European policy. BRUCE."

Since E. was lunching with Phyllis Dillon, I took Audrey with me to La Méditerranée where we devoured some excellent shell fish.

Tonight we went for dinner to the Windsors'. The Windsors' dinner was a large one - Fleur Cowles, Margaret Biddle, Dorothy Kane, Jimmy Donahue, the Plevens, Barrachin, the Kingsbury-Smiths, the Pattens and others. As usual their china and table ornaments were incomparable. The Loup de Mer, blazing with ignited brandy, was excellent. I had a talk after dinner with Barrachin about the European Army. He has not changed his mind since I last discussed it with him more than a year ago. He is still against it and I assume can carry the votes of his dissident Gaullist group. He is an attractive man. Windsor is disturbed over the extent of the anti-American feeling in Great Britain.

Earlier in the day at the office I received the visit of a Frenchman who had called on me several times saying he was a friend of Cabot Lodge but always refusing to give his name.

He was aged about forty, evidently a former army officer, intensely Pétainist. He seemed surprised I had not received any instructions from President Eisenhower about his visit.

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He stated [redacted] the U. S. Government had "imposed" de Gaulle on the French people and that de Gaulle was merely a retired colonel, a traitor, and not worthy to be called a Frenchman. From that imposition all the present ills of France (including nationalization of industry, the social security system, and [redacted] that only a minority of French citizens voted) have flowed. President Eisenhower should now withdraw his Ambassador, Dillon, from the present usurping government and favor the convocation of the still living members of the last true (Pétainiste) Parliament, who then would constitute a worthy government and constitution, devoting their attention initially to doing in the Communists.

I dealt with this fanciful farrago of unreality politely but unequivocally.

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SATURDAY
JUNE 13, 1953

Went to the Communications Center at the Embassy where I read and sent messages. The Slater family lunched with us, including sweet little Valérie.

E. and I took Sasha and David on an antiquing tour with us this afternoon, and at 5:00 o'clock I called on Jean Monnet at the Hotel Bristol. He returned today by air from his triumphal visit to the United States. He told me [redacted] interesting things explanatory of information which had been cabled me from Washington. The question of financing the Coal and Steel Community has made great strides. The President has communicated with the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees on the subject and an answer is expected from them early next week which will be communicated by Monnet to the Assembly at Strasbourg.

I had a talk with Alphand tonight on problems of mutual interest.

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